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Limitations — what RS-Key does not do, and why

RS-Key is experimental firmware. Its security review is project-led. The threat model describes the security boundary, and Testing describes the checks and their scope.

Cryptography

  • RSA side-channel coverage has limits. rsk-rsa uses base blinding and checks CRT results before returning them. In the optimized CRT path, the private exponent still selects a table address during modular exponentiation. A host observing whole-operation timing and a lab observing activity inside one operation are different cases. See the constant-time audit and the residual and deferred hardening in PLAT-CRYPTO-002 and PLAT-BUILD-005.

Flash storage

  • Integrity depends on the root. Storage v2 authenticates expected records and detects damaged or missing values. Before OTP provisioning, its root derives from the public chip serial. A raw flash writer can forge authority under that root. Secure startup closes the public-root path when migration and the fresh flash scrub finish and page 58 is sealed. See OTP fuses.
  • Freshness is limited to a live backend instance. The main directory and counter banks retain the latest authority they have accepted in RAM. Replacing both counter banks with an older copy during a live mount is rejected, including for PIN retries. Reads authenticate the requested value, so unrelated damage may surface only at mutation or recovery. After a cold boot, replaying older valid flash state can restore old records and counters. The BOOTSEL partition table limits access to the store. Firmware anti-rollback applies to images. See Flash snapshot rollback.
  • Legacy import has a trust boundary. A verified newer publication takes precedence over an older import manifest. If all v2 evidence is lost and the surviving media looks like a valid legacy layout, boot can admit it as legacy. Import can preserve readable bytes and check their layout. The integrity of data written by the legacy store depends on that store’s own guarantees.
  • Mirroring consumes erase cycles. In a software NOR run of 20,000 updates to one four-byte counter, v2 programmed 1,941,056 bytes and erased each of its ten counter sectors 47 times. The legacy backend programmed 320,628 bytes and erased each of its 32 sectors once or twice. The v2 run left the main payload and directory unchanged. This measures one write pattern. Physical endurance depends on the flash chip and use pattern. See Storage and failure injection.

Seals and PINs

  • Page 58 and the records it protects. After the latch closes, device-sealed records covered by migration require the fused MKEK. An unreadable MKEK blocks migration at boot and prevents those records from opening under the public root. A legacy lock can deny BOOTSEL reads while the latch still awaits completion. See Production setup.
  • Legacy PIN verifiers remain readable by the applets. The verifier format permits a fallback to the old root after the latch closes. Substituting a verifier also requires flash state that the authenticated store will accept. A substituted verifier does not unwrap the original OpenPGP data-encryption key (DEK).
  • PIN-dependent migration needs the PIN. Present each existing PIN or update its reference as directed during provisioning. This includes the PIV PUK and the OpenPGP admin PIN and resetting code, which ordinary use may never present. A legacy OpenPGP DEK copy can remain reachable through an offline guess against the old root, even after another reference migrated. See PLAT-THREAT-002 in Platform assumptions and the production procedure.
  • PIV data objects can be visible in a flash dump. The card requires PIN verification to read Cardholder Fingerprints (5FC103), Facial Image (5FC108), Printed Information (5FC109) and Iris Images (5FC121) through PIV. The objects are authenticated in storage and their contents are plaintext. The per-object limit is 3063 bytes. The card stores data supplied by the host. See the PIV guide.

Algorithms and implementations

The fips-profile build applies algorithm and PIN restrictions. The FIPS-style profile guide covers its validation status.

  • OpenPGP curves. The applet supports brainpoolP256r1 and brainpoolP384r1. Its supported set excludes brainpoolP512r1, X448 and Ed448. The advertised algorithm list reflects the implemented curves.
  • RSA decryption exposes a padding result. A host that can drive OpenPGP PSO:DECIPHER with PW1 verified can distinguish a successful PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt from a refusal. That provides a padding oracle to an authorized caller. The unpadding code uses masks for its checks. Returning plaintext on success still exposes its length.
  • On-card RSA generation can be slow. The prime search dominates RSA-3072 and RSA-4096. Both cores can search with the hot path in SRAM. Latency varies with board, build and the number of candidates rejected. The firmware sends keepalives while supported transports wait. See RSA on core1.
  • ML-DSA needs client support. RS-Key supports ML-DSA-44, -65 and -87 for FIDO2. advertise-pqc enables their advertisement in getInfo. A client can request the algorithms with that flag off. Unknown-algorithm parsing and ML-DSA credential creation are separate compatibility issues. Mozilla documents the former fix in authenticator-rs and tracks the latter separately. See Build options and Firefox’s ML-DSA issue.
  • ML-KEM scope. The vendor MSE channel can combine P-256 with ML-KEM-768 when the host supplies an encapsulation key. Standard CTAP PIN/UV protocols still use P-256. See the MSE protocol.

Backup & migration

  • Seed backup recovers the deterministic FIDO identity. Restoring the seed can recover non-resident credentials when the client or relying party still has their credential IDs. Resident passkeys, OpenPGP and PIV private keys, OATH credentials and OTP slots require separate migration or re-enrolment.
  • Finalizing closes the export window. Retain the phrase or enough SLIP-39 shares before finalizing. A factory reset reopens the window for a new identity. The fips-profile build blocks seed export. See the seed backup guide.
  • Flash geometry is part of the upgrade contract. Keep FLASH_SIZE and KVMAIN when updating a provisioned key. Changing either can move the partitions away from existing data. See Build options.

Hardware / physical

  • Physical and lab attacks. The security boundary is the general-purpose RP2350 family. A4 addresses the original A2 boot ROM and OTP power-glitch findings. Direct antifuse imaging remains a concern, and a separate lab attack recovered a challenge secret after restoring Secure debug on a decapped A4. RS-Key uses chaff for the demonstrated paired-row readout. It still relies on Secure reads of page 58. The application of the debug attack to those rows is an inference from their access policy. See the threat model and Ledger Donjon’s experiment.
  • TRNG health checks and entropy. The firmware leaves the RP2350’s continuous health checks enabled. Their success does not quantify entropy from a degraded source. A raw-source measurement under desk conditions is pending in PLAT-TRNG-002. Qualification across supply, temperature and process is an accepted gap in PLAT-TRNG-003. See Platform assumptions.
  • Flash failures can look like absence to callers. The storage API has both lossy reads and probes that distinguish absence from failure. Security-sensitive provisioning and authorization paths use fallible probes or take a restrictive path. The effect of a real interrupted program or erase is a separate hardware question. The supply-cut assumption in PLAT-FLASH-001 is pending. See the threat model.
  • External-flash XIP has a time-of-check gap. Secure Boot verifies the image, then the CPU fetches instructions from flash. An interposer on the external flash bus can serve different bytes at those stages. The combined firmware and its working memory exceed the available SRAM. RP2354 puts flash inside the package, which removes the exposed external flash chip from that attack path. The FIDO2 demonstration on Romu used Bitmerse’s RS-Key port. See Hardware and the RP2350 datasheet.
  • TrustZone separates USB framing from Secure services. Secure owns the USB controller and lifecycle, applets, storage and OTP. Non-secure code sees plaintext that crosses its transport, including a host PIN sent in a plain CCID APDU. Secure applets share one trust domain. See Architecture for the boundary and Testing for the scope of board results.
  • Anti-rollback is an image policy. The OTP version floor has 48 one-way steps. The boot ROM checks a versioned image against the floor. ROLLBACK_REQUIRED requires a rollback version on signed images. See Anti-rollback.
  • Firmware images are signed for production and execute from flash. RS-Key uses signed XIP images. The RP2350’s encrypted-boot mechanism loads a payload into SRAM. See the RP2350 datasheet.
  • The display build runs beyond the nominal clock ratings. It sets the RP2350 to 160 MHz, above the 150 MHz rating. The write-only PIO link clocks the panel at 80 MHz. The ST7789T3 specifies a minimum serial write cycle of 16 ns (62.5 MHz). The driver cannot read back pixels to detect a panel transfer error. Measurements apply to the clock and board used. See the trusted display guide and ST7789T3 datasheet.

Protocol / compatibility

  • USB identity affects discovery. The default identity is 0x1209:0xF1D2 with the RS-Key reader name. ykman and Yubico Authenticator look for the Yubico reader name and use the opt-in VIDPID=Yubikey5 build for interop. Linux device permissions and CCID driver recognition are separate from application discovery. See Build options and Linux setup.
  • FIDO attestation can identify the device. Ordinary packed basic attestation carries a stable per-device certificate. A client that receives that certificate can correlate registrations. A CTAP client can request attestationFormatsPreference: ["none"] to omit the statement when enterprise attestation is not performed. An eligible enterprise request can return the provisioned organization’s chain. See Attestation.
  • PIV attestation uses a device-generated identity. Host import into slot f9 and replacement of object 5FFF01 are refused after management authentication, with 6A80. ATTEST uses the device’s identity. See the PIV guide.
  • OpenPGP attestation uses a device-generated identity. Its certificate is self-signed. Host writes to attributes DA or certificate FC return 6B00. Import and generation requests for the attestation slot return 6A80. See the OpenPGP guide.
  • PIV retry budgets must be nonzero. With PIN and management authentication in place, SET RETRIES returns 6A80 for a zero PIN or PUK budget and leaves the counters intact.
  • SELECT by AID accepts P2 = 04. RS-Key accepts it alongside P2 = 00 for clients such as PicoForge.
  • OpenPGP secure messaging is unavailable. OpenPGP commands use ordinary APDUs. Access still depends on the command’s PIN and presence policy.
  • The available presence input depends on the board. Ordinary builds use BOOTSEL or a configured GPIO. The display adds on-device PIN entry and a named prompt for operations that require confirmation. The shipped builds use PINs for user verification and offer no biometric reader. See Hardware and the threat model.

Operational

  • A logical deletion can leave old flash bytes. Superseded records can remain until compaction or a scrub reclaims their sectors. OTP migration schedules a scrub of superseded weak-root copies and requires a fresh successful scrub before sealing page 58.
  • Using a stolen key depends on its remaining gates. Someone with the device and its PIN can authorize the operations that PIN covers when they also satisfy the operation’s other gates. FIDO soft-lock protects the seed with a separate off-device key. See Soft-lock and the threat model.